Notizensicherheit

Wenn man einen nicht unerheblichen Aufwand betrieben hat, um die nur halbwegs verschlüsselte Yojimbo-Datenbank zu sichern, klingt der Ansatz von Zachary Schneirov wie Sirenengesang:

Maintaining an encrypted database of notes was one of the main reasons I built Notational Velocity. And though CoreData makes it incredibly easy to persist an object-graph to disk, to this day there’s no way add a layer of encryption beneath it. So NV serializes all note-data to memory, compresses it, and then encrypts it before writing it all out in a single atomic operation that’s protected by the HFS+ metadata journal. And to handle incremental updates (i.e., auto-saving every few seconds), it uses its own incrementally compressed, encrypted write-ahead log. [...]

In the medium term, I hope to have a means of both maintaining the same set of notes in several places without losing any information and without needing to trust system administrators of so-called “cloud” services, as well as accessing those notes on Linux hosts natively and securely. In the long-term, I’d like to apply that solution to the emerging field of “cloud”-based services in general, which (save for a few like Dropbox) are a massive step backward in terms of user-control, privacy, and OS-integration, from what the Internet used to be 20 years ago.